Criticism on Christian Ethics

[Philonous]

Criticism on Christian Ethics

Christian ethics is not ethics in an ordinary sense….when we discuss about ethics we ordinarily discuss about what criterion we depend upon to make an ethical evaluation on certain actions. Consequential ethics would insist that the best criterion is to observe the consequences that proceed from our actions. Deontologists would argue that intention and intrinsic content of the behavior should be the criterion of evaluating behaviors. What both ethical systems have in common is they observe ethics in terms of objective criterion (criterion independent of the mind). Christian ethics largely depends upon one’s relationship with the Supreme Being. The underlying principle that defines the relationship between the creature and the creator is obedience (on the part of the sentient created) towards the commands of the creator. In Pauline theology, the problem is that people cannot obey God since they are hopelessly separate from God, and the only way to reconnect with God and to obey is to accept Salvation. However Salvation is merely a theological concept that functions as a restoring relationship and later I will explain why this is so.

Here, ethics is largely relative and relational…It is arguable that Christian ethics is a kind of moral relativism. Unlike how moral relativism is conventionally understood, in the sense that morality is essentially a variety of beliefs across different cultures, Christian ethics is a kind of moral relativism in the sense that the moral value of action of the created is relative to the judgment and commandment of the creator. It is the subjective beliefs of the creator that defines what is good and bad, but to simply accept the subjective beliefs of the creator would be just as ridiculous as to accept the personal whims of a dictator. There doesn’t seem to be an objective law (like the constitution) that evaluates what is right or wrong, but a mind-dependent entity (subjective) that decides what is right or wrong.

Thus the ultimate question is this: is something good because God says it is good or did God say something is good because it is good? The former indicates that whatever God says must be good, but this becomes arbitrary since whatever God means to say is good. The latter indicates that something is good independent of what God says; hence it would undermine God’s sovereignty. A modern Christian would argue that God himself is good, therefore God would not command horrible things. Yet it does not follow that God defines what is good; perhaps God says something is good because he knows that it is inherently good apart from his own subjective judgment. thus even if God himself is good this does not save the sovereignty of God; thus whether or not God commands someone to do something that is inherently good, that person should do it regardless of whether there is God or not; thus the existence of God would be superfluous on moral matters.

Even if God is good, another question emerges. Why is God good? and what is the reason for the reason for God’s goodness? When we say that “John is a good man” we are really evaluating his moral worth based upon an independent criterion which he has fulfilled. But when we say that God is good what do we really mean? Is it possible that god himself is good because there is an independent criterion that defines God as good? If so then does this undermine God’s sovereignty?

The concept of salvation is an interesting theological concept because the concept itself among many Christians is understood as a criterion that defines goodness. Thus ethics depends upon salivation. However this ethical evaluation is counter-intuitive. Let’s say that person A and person B were doing the same thing. They both saw a homeless veteran who inspired compassion in them and both person A and person B decides to offer some amount of money (what the homeless veteran will do with the money is beside the point). They both gave the money generously and they both did it out of compassion. Now if ethics is dependent on salvation then person A (who was saved) did a wonderful job but person B (not saved) did a horrible job, even though they both performed the same action with the same intention.

The problem here is that the salvation ethics fails to the make a distinction between religious significance and moral significance. Person A’s action is religiously significant because his actions are inspired by his religious commitment. Person B’s action, however, is religiously insignificant but morally significant. It is true that person A’s action was both morally and religiously significant, but it does not follow that person B’s action is morally insignificant. Perhaps person B is not concerned about the notion of salvation, and cares more about the moral significance. Regardless of whether someone makes a religious commitment, the action can be morally significant independent of religious commitment.

In conclusion, Christian ethics is more or less another form of moral relativism, subjectivism, and relationship ethics. It is not a form of ethics which we aspire to find an independent criterion that sufficiently defines what is good such that we can proceed to make legitimate value-judgment. It is largely relative to what God believes and commands, and the relationship with God. Perhaps if God told someone to do something because it is good, then the person will do it because it is good but not because God commands that person to do so.